So my former sister-in-law gave her husband a trip to spring training for his fiftieth birthday. Being selfless, two of his friends (including me) made the sacrifice and joined him on the trip. We’re spending four days seeing four ballgames. I’m going to try to blog occasionally.

The history of spring training is one of ongoing professionalization and standardization, which is a way of saying, “All eccentricities have been stomped out of it.”

In the early days of spring training, teams lacked set destinations. There were no permanent Florida or Arizona complexes. Depending on the year and where the manager felt like spending his spring, teams trained in Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, Catalina Island, California, Cuba.

Today, teams have expensive stadiums waiting for them. There are few holdouts, and with Barry Bonds’s retirement no one who reports late because they can’t be bothered to start on time. But for Dominicans with visa problems, punctuality is the rule. If the training season is used for anything more fun than training, it’s kept on the down low.

One of the reasons teams drifted from location to exotic location in the earliest days of spring training was because managers were looking for ways to control their players, to find the dry spots where a manager might find a drink but a player could not. John McGraw for many years favored Marlin, Texas, because it was unexotic, in the middle of nowhere, and – he hoped – better suited to controlling his players. (In later days, Casey Stengel, one of McGraw’s great managing disciples, solved this problem for himself by telling his players that they weren’t allowed to drink in the hotel bar, because that was where he did his drinking.)

This past Thursday afternoon the Giants were off, so we enjoyed a game at Maryvale Baseball Park in Phoenix. The Brewers hosted the Padres, lots of runs were scored, and we ended in a tie, 10-10, after ten innings. (In spring training, if a game is tied after nine innings, the managers agree to end the game after ten innings, regardless of the score.)

Prince Fielder At Bat

Prince Fielder At Bat

We sat a few rows behind the Padres dugout, amongst some great Brewer fans, knowledgeable about their team and its history. The game was not memorable, but there was a funny moment that we will be telling people about. We’ve encountered the spring training phenomenon of groupies, young women who come to the games, either as fans of a particular young player, or perhaps just to choose a young prospect, much the way Annie chose Nuke in “Bull Durham.” Late in the game, Padres shortstop prospect Sean Kazmar came out onto the on-deck circle as a pinch-hitter.  Now mind you, Sean is a good-looking specimen, better perhaps than his mug shot indicates:

Sean Kazmar, SS

Sean Kazmar, SS

A group of three women in their very early twenties started calling to him from the second row behind the Padres dugout. “Sean! Sean! Over here, Sean! Look at us!” One of the Brewer fans to my right shouted over to them: “Shut up, girls! Don’t distract him; he’s trying to become a millionaire!”

The Giants have a competition of sorts for the second-base position.  Yet, coming off a strong Arizona Fall League showing (.331/.392/.421) that mimicked his career minor-league line (.327/.391/.458), Kevin Frandsen is the favorite to win the second-base job. His first comparable player is Kevin Sefcik, who spent portions of six years as a back-up for the Phillies in the 1990s, hitting more or less (.275/.351/.371) what we might reasonably expect Frandsen to hit at the major-league level.

Mark DeRosa, Frandsen’s second comp, has had the career that might be considered Frandsen’s upside. The University of Pennsylvania Quakers’ quarterback was drafted by the Braves in the seventh round of the 1996 draft. He’s not been fazed by any of the innumerable new responsibilities he’s been handed over the years, and has become a bit of a super-utilityman. (Despite DeRosa’s many uses, the Cubs traded him in his last contract year to the Tribe, and while that should have provided the Indians a ready excuse to move Jhonny Peralta to third and Asdrubal Cabrera to short, it appears they’ll put DeRosa at third and simultaneously play three infielders at their second-best defensive positions.)

DeRosa’s power spike last year shouldn’t be expected every season. As a matter of fact, DeRosa can be a bit streaky. After missing most of April 2006 with a sprained ankle, DeRosa rejoined the Cubs roster and tore the cover off the ball. At the end of June, he was hitting .346/.401/.514. But 31-year-old infielders rarely morph into Ty Cobb-hitting outfielders overnight, and DeRosa came back to earth, batting a more DeRosa-like .265/.333/.423 the rest of the way. The Tribune Company, of course, bought the May-June surge and gave DeRosa his current contract. Should Frandsen surf a similar wave in 2009, let’s hope the Giants don’t start shoveling money his way.

Steve Dillard, Frandsen’s third comp, spent seven years (not counting one game in 1975) as a utility infielder for the Red Sox, Tigers, White Sox and Cubs. He hit .243/.297/.343. Joe Strain, the fourth comp, was a Giant (1979-80) and then a Cub (1981) and hit .250/.292/.288 in 572 career at-bats. Giants fans hope Frandsen does better than either. What Frandsen has going for him are work ethic and contact-rate. But he doesn’t draw many walks, has middling power, and is an average fielder. All of those things may be an improvement over last year’s second basemen, but they should mean the Giants are still looking to plug that hole.

I saw in Friday’s Chronicle that the Giants have released Dave Roberts.  This demonstrates that the Giants — finally — understand the concept of sunk costs.  The contract they gave Roberts at his advanced age was a mistake.  They have admitted to themselves that although they will be paying Roberts some $6.5 million in 2009, he was going to be doing them no good, and they might as well put his roster spot to use evaluating someone younger who might be part of the next Giants team to win the division.

Although I think this is the right decision for the Giants, we should remember all that Roberts accomplished.  Roberts wasn’t supposed to be a major leaguer in the first place. Guys who are supposed to be major leaguers don’t last until the 28th round, which is where the Tigers drafted Roberts after his senior season at UCLA. He quickly proved to be more than just a track star in cleats, but he didn’t reach Double-A until he was almost 25. In 1998 he hit .326/.434/.466 in the Southern League before the Tigers traded him to Cleveland. He was even better after the trade, smoking the ball to the tune of .361/.447/.542; his efforts wouldn’t even earn him a courtesy September callup.

He was traded (along with Tim Worrell) for the remains of Geronimo Berroa’s career, starting a trend in which Roberts would be traded every year or two for a lot less than he was worth. Three years later, the Indians would trade him to the Dodgers for two minor leaguers who would forever stay minor leaguers. At the 2004 trading deadline, he was sent to Boston for Henri Stanley, a name that only members of the Sons of Sam Horn message board recognize. Five months later, he was dealt yet again, this time to San Diego for three players and cash, which sounds nice until you read the names of those three players: Jay Payton, Ramon Vazquez, and Dave Pauley. At least the Red Sox got the cash.

Along the way Roberts would get the opportunity to play a little. After a disappointing debut in 1999, he batted just 26 times over the next two years. He finally held down a starting job after joining the Dodgers in 2002, at which point he was 30 years old. He made up for the late start to his career by doing pretty much what he’s done ever since: hit for a decent average (.277), draw some walks (.353 OBP), and steal bases with great efficiency (45 SB, 10 CS). In 2003, he was 40-of-54 on the basepaths. In 2004, he set the all-time NL record for most steals in a season (33) with no more than one caught stealing. He then joined the Red Sox and stole five or six more bases, none of any real consequence. He was on the roster for the team’s playoff run but was of such little use that he didn’t bat once in October; undoubtedly the team would have won without him. (Irony off.)

Roberts then returned to the NL West, where the immense ballparks are a perfect fit for his brand of speed, defense, and all the power of a San Francisco supervisor. For his career Roberts has stolen 243 bases while being caught just 58 times. That’s a stolen base percentage of 80.7 percent. In major league history, he ranks 11th in stolen base percentage among players with 200 or more attempts:


Player           SB  CS   SB%
Carlos Beltran  275  37  88.1%
Tim Raines      808 146  84.7%
Eric Davis      349  66  84.1%
Willie Wilson   668 134  83.3%
Barry Larkin    379  77  83.1%
Tony Womack     363  74  83.1%
Davy Lopes      557 114  83.0%
Stan Javier     246  51  82.8%
Carl Crawford   302  64  82.5%
Julio Cruz      343  78  81.5%
Dave Roberts    243  58  80.7%

More significantly, Roberts is one of the few major leaguers to earn a reputation as a big-league speedster almost entirely in his thirties. Through his age-29 season, Roberts had only 12 career steals; he has 231 since, and counting. In major league history, no player with fewer than 50 steals before age 30 has stolen more bases after age 30 than Roberts. (The closest is Jimmy Austin, a St. Louis Browns’ third baseman of yore who stole 30 bases before turning 30, and 214 afterwards.) Roberts has 219 more steals after turning 30 than before, a number that ties him for fifth all-time:


Player          SB < 30   SB > 30   Diff.
Otis Nixon        105       515      410
Davey Lopes        99       458      359
Lou Brock         334       604      270
Honus Wagner      239       464      225
Sam Rice           66       285      219
Dave Roberts       12       231      219

Davey Lopes is probably the best comp for Dave Roberts; both were late bloomers who got their shot with the Dodgers and became everyday players noted for their speed, and who occasionally put up sensational stolen base numbers. (Lopes was 45-of-49 in steals in 1978, 44-of-48 in 1979, and 47-of-51 in 1985, when he was 40 years old and only appeared in 99 games.) Lopes was the better player given his surprising power; the 5’9”, 170-pounder hit 155 career home runs, including 28 in 1979. Roberts, on the other hand, has had random strangers approach him to say “thank you” every day for the last four years, and quite likely will never have to pay for a drink in New England for the rest of his life.

For our second installment of “Fun With Comparables,” we’re going to look at the Travis Ishikawa, who will get the chance this year to build on his 2008 minor-league breakout season.  Ishikawa’s first comp is Garrett Jones, currently 28, whose only major-league experience was with the 2006 Twins.  In 84 plate appearances, he hit .208/.262/.338.  Guys who can’t field have to be monsters with the bat, and Jones isn’t.  Ishikawa, on the other hand, is a excellent defensive first baseman who will take the occasional walk.  Jones mastered neither skill.  Now a Pirate, Jones is waiting for something bad to happen to Adam LaRoche.

Ishikawa’s second comp, is listed as “Mike Hocutt.”  I’ve searched high and low and cannot find a thing about any such player at any level of organized ball.  Oh, well.  Let’s move along.

Over parts of four seasons, and 149 plate appearances, Jim Adduci, Ishikawa’s third comp, hit .236/.242/.326, and was out of baseball at age 29. On April 19, 1987, Adduci was actually purchased by the San Francisco Giants from the Milwaukee Brewers, only to be sent back in one week.  (Having a young Will Clark at first allows that.)  On June 4, the Brewers released Adduci, and he finished the season playing for the Taiyo Whales in Japan.

Ishikawa’s fourth comp is former Athletic Dan Johnson.  Johnson can do two things Oakland loves — hit for power and take some walks — but he doesn’t do enough of either to overcome his deficiencies.  His poor 2007 led to the Daric Barton era in Oakland.  The Rays picked Johnson up off waivers last year, and assigned him to Durham, where he was player of the year.  The Rays didn’t have much use for his skills til late-season roster expansion.  Then, on September 9, in his first big-league at-bat with his new team, he took Jonathan Papelbon deep to help pull out a win in the ninth inning of the biggest win in franchise history at the time.  At the close of the season, Johnson went for the payday, signing a seven-figure deal to play in Japan in 2009.

While Ishikawa has promise, his minor-league career is a bit checkered, and he is already 25, so pinning too much hope on his bat might lead to disappointment.  He plays Gold-Glove calibre first base, though, and that might count for a lot with Pablo Sandoval’s stylings at third.  If Ishikawa, like two of his comps, ends up playing some in Japan, he might naturally prove popular there.

My favorite baseball annual, Baseball Prospectus, lists statistics for the players it profiles, and uses its proprietary PECOTA system to project a player’s likely statistics for the upcoming season. PECOTA projects player performance based on comparisons with thousands of historical player-seasons. The annual also lists for each player his four highest scoring comparable players, as determined by PECOTA. These are the four most similar comparables, and not the entire sample from which PECOTA generates its projection.

The comparables are only supposed to suggest what a player might do in a particular year; if the top comparables for young outfielder Johnny Wetcougar, 22, are Dave Winfield and Ed Delahanty, the most you can infer is that the system likes him and thinks he’s going to be a good hitter in the style of those players at a similar point in their career. The comparables do not suggest either that Wetcougar will deliver 3000 hits like Winfield or get drunk and fall off of an open drawbridge like Delahanty. The PECOTA comps are not destiny, but they do represent a snapshot of how the listed player was performing at the same age as the current player. Thus, if a 23-year-old hitter is compared to Sammy Sosa, he’s actually being compared to a 23-year-old Sammy Sosa, not to Sosa at the age of 31, when he was one of the best hitters on the planet, or Sosa at 38, when he was an adequate DH who could stand to be platooned.

Having made that statement, I am not forced to admit that I like to take them as destiny, or at least a hint thereof.  Between now and Opening Day, I’ll be taking a look at the comparables for each of the players likely to get major playing time for the Giants this season, with the hopes of discerning what sorts of performances we might expect from them.  We start today with catcher Bengie Molina.

Molina’s top four comparables are Brian Harper, Darrin Fletcher, Bill Freehan, and Jeff Conine.  Harper’s age-34 season was his second-to-last, and marked a steep decline for him.  He actually caught in only 25 games for the 1994 Brewers, a significant decrease from the 130-odd he’s caught in each of the previous two years.  He had fewer than half the plate appearances he’d had in either of the two previous seasons, most of those at DH.  His rate stats (.291/.318./398) may have explained why Phil Garner used him so much less, but it also had something to do with the rise of 24-year-old Dave Nilsson.  For the first time in six years, Harper’s EQA was less than the league average.  The next season, he had seven plate appearances with the Athletics, and retired.

Darrin Fletcher at 34 had 453 plate appearances for the 2001 Blue Jays, which was way too many considering his rate stats fell off a cliff from previous seasons.  .226/.274/.353 (a .218 EQA) is unacceptable, certainly from a catcher not known for his defense.  But with Kevin Cash the best catcher in their farm system, the Jays were a bit stymied for a solution.  So desparate were the Jays for a catcher that for 2002, they signed minor-league journeyman free agent Ken Huckaby, whose claim to fame at the time was one major-league at-bat, albeit for the 2001 world champion Arizona Diamondbacks.  Fletcher’s EQA fell to .202 in 2002, and he retired.

Bill Freehan was one of the great catchers in the 1960s.  A five-time Gold Glove winner, he held the career record for fielding percentage until 2002, and was runner-up for the AL MVP award in 1968, when his Detroit Tigers won the World Series.  At 34, though, Freehan was in his last season, catching in 61 games, the same number as Bruce Kimm, and only two more than John Wockenfuss.  He retired at the end of the season.

At 34, Jeff Conine still had six more years of above-league-average hitting ahead of him, and would play until he was 41.  The fact that PECOTA sees Conine as a comparable for Molina is encouraging, but the fact Conine was not a catcher makes this comp perhaps less reliable.

It might be argued that Molina’s career highs in RBI (and double plays hit into!) last season was the result of career highs in games and plate appearances, something of a red flag for a catcher who will turn 35 in July.  Fortunately, Molina is in the last year of his contract, and Buster Posey should be ready to take over behind the plate in 2010.

Some assume that the reason Joe Crede is not today a Giant is that Brian Sabean didn’t match or try to match the Twins’ offer.  What they miss, though, is that Sabean could have done so, and Crede still might have chosen to sign elsewhere.  It’s not my job to defend Sabean, since much of what he’s done in recent years is pretty indefensible, but Sabean is not the only one making the decision about where Joe Crede plays baseball.

I know that in my own career, I’ve made decisions about what job to take or not take based on money, or on my marriage, or on medical benefits for my kids, or on long-term goals, or on my daily satisfaction with the work, or on the “culture” of the office.  The only person who might have grasped all these factors, or how they balanced, was my wife.

Now we hear and read a lot about similar decisions made by talented ballplayers.  We speculate that this guy followed the money, or the other guy went to a team in the region where he was raised.  We’ll assume that the agent actually makes the decision, or that the player picked the team because he hits well in their home park.

But at the end of the day, we have no idea what we’re talking about.  That’s because the decision about where to play, like our own decisions on where to work, is an intensely personal one that considers factors we cannot know.  Baseball players are like the rest of us.  They have wives and families, they like big cities or small towns, warm weather or cold, golfing or surfing.

For Crede, to take one example, this was the first time in his professional life he’d been able to negotiate anything other than his salary (and he hadn’t even had that opportunity much).  He was 18 when the White Sox selected him in the fifth round of the 1996 draft, and now, more than twelve years later, he’s been able to choose his employer, the city where he’ll work, and presumably, live and raise his family.  He’s never had that choice or one like it before, and as to his motives in selecting the Twins, let’s face it, we’re all just guessing.  Like a lot about baseball, and a lot about life, this is one where no one knows anything.

A friend of mine was lamenting Alex Rodriguez’s use of steroids, pointing out that three of A-Rod’s five highest single-season home run totals occured during the three seasons he admits to using illegal substances while a Texas Ranger, and, more damningly, that his time as a Ranger showed a marked jump in homers from the previous period in his career.  But this sort of analysis omits any context for Rodriguez’s accomplishments, the most important of which just might be the home field, at which he played half his games.

Comparing Rodriguez’s last three years in Seattle (1998 to 2000), during which most of his home games were at Safeco Field, the most difficult ballpark in the American League in which to hit home runs, with his three years in Texas (2001 to 2003), which was the easiest park in the league for the long ball, is instructive.  During those years in Seattle, Rodriguez averaged 17 home runs at home and 25 on the road; in his Texas years, he averaged 29 at home and 23 on the road.  The entire difference can be explained away by where he played.  (His five-year averages with the Yankees are 22 homers at Yankee Stadium, a more neutral ballpark, and 20 on the road.)   Another conclusion can be drawn: that Rodriguez began using performance-enhancing substances far earlier than he acknowledged or continued using them after he said he had stopped.

But his statistics in Texas cannot support the case that whatever substances he used during those years affected his homerun output.

It was a bit unsettling to see Jeff Kent’s notoriously gruff facade crumble during the press conference in which he announced his retirement last month.  Kent had always struck me as akin to another Giant, Bill Terry, a player who spent the better part of two decades making it clear that he did not love the game of baseball, but, realizing his talent was exceptional, found the game the best way to make a buck.  Just as Terry would have been content to serve as an executive for Standard Oil had they paid him more than did Charles Stoneham, so Kent would have worked his Texas ranch had punching cows paid more than did the major leagues.  Thus the sight of him fighting back tears was surprising, and, to me, affecting.

Less than two months shy of his 41st birthday, there’s little doubt it was time for Kent to say goodbye.  He hit .280/.327/.418 for the Dodgers in 2008, with just 12 homers, his lowest total since 1996.  He missed most of the final month of the season due to a torn meniscus that required surgery; though he rehabbed doggedly and made the Dodgers’ post-season roster, he was confined to the bench while Blake DeWitt took over at second base.  A future as a part-time player was unthinkable for Kent, who had once declared, upon being sidelined by a more minor injury, “I hate watching baseball.”

While Kent hasn’t received many fond farewells, the widespread consensus in the mainstream media is that he’s bound for the Hall of Fame.  From a traditional perspective, it’s not difficult to see why.  Although he didn’t debut in the majors until he was 24 and didn’t top 400 plate appearances until the following year, Kent nonetheless racked up 2,461 hits and 377 homers, reached the postseason seven times, made five All-Star teams, and won the 2000 NL MVP award.  The 351 home runs he hit as a second baseman are tops for the position, far outdistancing the second-, third-, and fourth-ranked second-sackers — Ryne Sandberg (277), Joe Morgan (266), and Rogers Hornsby (263) — all of whom are enshrined in Cooperstown.  He also leads all second basemen in RBI and extra-base hits, while ranking 12th in games played.

If Kent’s case for Cooperstown appears on firm footing from a traditional standpoint, it’s on shakier ground sabermetrically.  As odd as it sounds for a player who lasted through his age-40 season, he’s hampered by a lack of durability.  Kent topped 145 games just five times (including 2002, the season he infamously broke his wrist while “washing his truck“) and averaged only 133 games a hear over his last six seasons, the Houston/Los Angeles phase of his career.  By some sabermetric measures, he tops only one of the nine second basemen elected by the Baseball Writers Association of America, that being Jackie Robinson, whose career was shortened by the color barrier but who nonetheless had a peak that was well above average, to say nothing of his monumentally large role in history.

It won’t get much better for Kent, either.  By the time he actually reaches the 2014 ballot in the company of Greg Maddux and Mike Mussina, both Craig Biggio and Roberto Alomar will likely be enshrined.  The former is a lock given his 3,060 hits, while the latter’s round-number combination of a .300 lifetime batting average and 10 Gold Gloves probably put him into the no-brainer category of many voters.  All these factors may mean Kent doesn’t get in the first year he appears on the ballot.

Kent was a good player for a long time, and an often misunderstood one.  His lack of charisma and his businesslike approach made him an easy target, but he was passionate in his work ethic and respect for the game.  The more I look at his numbers the more I realize he’s actually a borderline Hall of Famer.  (Unless one attaches special importance to his leading his position in homers, which has much to do with his era, it’s difficult to draw the conclusion that he’s an elite or even average Hall-of-Fame second baseman.)  Nonetheless, were I a voter, I can’t help but suspect my own memories of his high level of play with the Giants would sway me into making him a first-ballot Hall of Famer.

High on the Giants’ list of off-season priorities is fixing the infield, and Brian Sabean appears to be trying to do that.  Pablo Sandoval will play more at catcher and probably some at the infield corners (giving the team a latter-day Brenly vibe); Travis Ishikawa will get his shot at first, with perhaps Josh Phelps platooning; Emmanuel Burriss and Kevin Frandsen will get their shots at second.  Barring trading Rowand, Molina, and/or Winn — options that Sabean should entertain, even if he really means it when he says he intends to contend in a weak NL West — the real problem area is the left side of the infield.

Bringing Edgar Renteria back to the National League — not cheaply, however — has its chances of working out reasonably well.  Adding a few points of OBP and SLG by moving to the weaker league, and adding Denver and Phoenix to his frequently-visited opponents’ parks, it isn’t hard to envision July headlines touting some sort of resurgence from a player whose skill set wouldn’t really change fundamentally.  Add in that he ought to be thoroughly adequate at the plate where the Giants got nothing of the sort last season, and I can see how this ends up being a slight improvement to the team.  (The Giants will give back some of their gains from Renteria’s offense due to his declining defense.)

This still leaves third base to stock somehow.  A full season of Sandoval at third would be a bit brutal defensively, so perhaps Sabean isn’t done.  Among the aforementioned veterans, dealing Winn remains the move I’d most like to see made, in part because I’d rather see the Giants add a rightfielder with some power, whether that’s taking another spin with strong-armed Nate Shierholtz or taking a low-end risk via free agency.  Counting on Sandoval, Ishikawa and Renteria, too, that adds up to an offense that might actually be average.

Putting the Big Unit in China Basin is yet another indication that the Giants take themselves seriously.  While one year ago I would have found that laughable, I’m just maybe starting to see things from Sabean’s point of view.  The Dodgers and D’backs haven’t made the sorts of moves that convincingly elevate them past 85 wins, and while so much of the Giants’ limited success last season depended on happy accidents in their record in one-run ballgames (going 31-21), there’s some reason to take them just abuot as seriously.  They’re not the team that fielded an almost entirely putrid lineup last April, they’re the one we saw in September, the one that had a few interesting prospects on the field.  The team needed help in the bullpen, and Sabean’s tried to scare some up.  The team needed a plausible regular at short, and whatever else you may say about him, Edgar Renteria is exactly that.  The team still needs some power in the lineup, which is why we keep hearing Manny Ramirez rumors, though the shame of that would be how it might suck playing time away from Fred Lewis, one of their better hitters, but if Lewis in turn reduces Randy Winn to a less-regular starter, even that could turn out well.  I admit, I’d be a little more enthusiastic if they came up with a power-hitting third baseman who lets them relegate Pablo Sandoval to sharing playing time at first with Travis Ishikawa and behind the plate with Benjie Moliina, but we’ll see if Joe Crede proves himself healthy enough to engender any interest in his coming workout.

So, put Randy Johnson onto that sort of team in this sort of division, and yeah, I like it well enough.  He’ll get his 300th win as a Giant.  (He’s just five away.)  He should be effective enough, he saves Team Sabean from having to count too heavily on Noah Lowry to round out the rotation, and I guess there’s something sort of amusing about having someone who reduces Barry Zito to not merely an expensive mistake, but the most expensive fifth starter ever in human history.

Pretty interesting read.  The highlight for me:

I had no intentions of trying to outspend the Yankees or Red Sox.  There was no reason to. I didnt have to beat either of those teams unless I made it to the World Series. The only teams I had to be better than were those in the National League, and more importantly, those in my division.  There were no big spending rivals close to home, so the AL East could spend themselves silly. My plans were to spend to win, not to spend for spending’s sake.  IMHO, the money I could save being in the 2nd tier of payroll could be invested in scouting and development. I made this clear to any and all of the owners that I spoke to across the league. Of course that didnt stop some from trying to convince some owners otherwise.

What Cuban’s writing about is diminishing returns.  As teams prove time and again, there is only so much you need to spend to compete — and win — in major league baseball.

« Previous PageNext Page »